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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT -JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS
RAISED BY SPECIAL APPEARANCE - RES ADjUDICATA -
FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES
A husband secured a limited divorce in the District of Columbia on
the ground of cruelty (cruelty not being a ground for absolute divorce
in that jurisdiction) and was directed to pay alimony to his wife. Sub-
sequently he changed his domicile to Virginia and while so domiciled se-
cured an absolute divorce without alimony on the ground of desertion.
In this latter action the wife was personally served with process in the
District of Columbia and made a special appearance in the action to
challenge the husband's jurisdictional residence in Virginia. After sub-
mission of the issues to a commissioner, the court overruled the wife's
contentions and granted the divorce without her participation in the
merits. Thereafter the husband sought a modification of the original
District of Columbia alimony decree, presenting the Virginia decree as
the ground therefor. His request was granted by the District Court and
that judgment was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States the judgment was reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions to give full faith and credit to the decree of the Virginia court.'
This utterance of the court is one which has long been awaited by
the commentators and law review writers of the country, as well as by
the drafters of the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, and
will no doubt become the subject of general comment. At the time of
this writing at least two expressions of editorial opinion have appeared to
the knowledge of the writer.2
The principal case raises two very interesting questions, both of
which relate to the attitude of the federal courts with respect to the full
faith and credit clause.' The first involves the attitude of the federal
1 Davis v. Davis, - U.S. -, 59 S.Ct. 3, 83 L.Ed. S2 (1938).Strahorn, "The Supreme Court Revisits Haddock," 33 I1. L. Rev. 41Z (x938);
and an anonymous note in 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 346 (1939).3
Art. 4, Sec. i.
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courts toward a special appearance, made for the purpose of challenging
the jurisdiction of the court, with respect to treating the matters therein
disposed of as being res adjudicata for the purpose of subsequent litiga-
tion; while the second, and perhaps major point of interest, involves the
much discussed question of validity of foreign divorce decrees.
I
The full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution and the
act of congress in pursuance thereof4 require that all courts of the
United States accord such faith and credit to judicial proceedings "as
they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are
taken." Notwithstanding these provisions it has become a well recog-
nized corollary that such treatment need not be accorded the judgments
or decrees of a sister state if the court rendering the same was without
jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter.' Thus it follows, that
a person sued in one state upon a judgment or decree rendered in a
court of another, is free to challenge the jurisdiction of the court of the
rendering state, and the court is free to inquire into that question with-
out fear of transgressing the constitutional mandate of full faith and
credit.6 But in recent years the Supreme Court of the United States
has placed an important limitation upon that rule by holding that where
a corporation has been made a party to a proceeding in a federal district
court and enters a special appearance therein for the purpose of chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of the court over its "person", it is thereafter
precluded from making a collateral attack upon a judgment therein
rendered when sued upon the same in another district court, on the
ground of res adjudicata.' In reaching its decision in that case, the
court pointed out that the defendant might have remained away from
the trial altogether, and that in such a case it would be entitled to litigate
the question, but, having chosen to make a special appearance, in which
the identical issue was determined and resolved against it, there was no
reason for permitting a retrial of the same. The defendant had "had its
day in court with respect to jurisdiction." In summarizing its position
the court said,' "Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation;
4 z3 U.S.C.A. sec. 687.
' Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 7 Wall. 521, 25 L.Ed. 687 (1873);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (x878); Renaud v. Abbott, 1x6 U.S. 277,
6 S.Ct. 1194, 29 L.Ed. 629 (x886)5 Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, '1 S.Ct. 773,
35 L.Ed. 464 (x891); Pennywit v. Foote, Z7 Ohio St. 600, 2z Am. Rep. 340 (x875).
' Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236, 51 L.Ed.
345 (1907)i Brown v. Fletcher, 210 U.S. 8z, 28 S.Ct. 702, 52 L.Ed. 966 (19o8).
Baldwzin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522 51 S.Ct. St7, 75 L.Ed.
xz4 (193).
' Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., supra, note 7-
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that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of
the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever set-
tled as between the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should
not apply in every case where one voluntarily appears, presents his case
and is fully heard, and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be
thereafter concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has
submitted his cause."
The obvious result of this decision was to convert a special appear-
ance into a general one, at least so far as the issue of jurisdiction of the
person raised thereby was concerned. Following the decision in the
Bald, n case there was some speculation among the authorities as to
whether the rule therein adopted would be extended to include cases
where jurisdiction of the subject matter was at issue.9 The principal
case would seem to settle conclusively all doubt in this respect in divorce
9 For a discussion of the controversy that arose over this question, see the anonymous
note in 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 346. Goodrich, in his second edition (1938) on Conflict of
Laws, states as section 20: "Jurisdiction of a court over the person, once determined by a
court, cannot be collaterally attacked by any proceedings involving the same parties or their
privies. Jurisdiction of a court over subject matter or status is probably always open to
collateral attack, though there is some authority that the principles of res judicata are
applicable there also." And again in section 69, speaking of the jurisdiction of courts,
that author says: " . . . A judgment rendered against a litigant who has either entered
an appearance or formally engaged in the prosecution or defense of a cause of action
cannot be collaterally attacked on the question of personal jurisdiction." (Italics are the
writer's).
For other expressions of editorial opinion on this phase of the problem, see: Farrier,
"Full Faith and Credit of Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts," z U. of Chicago L. Rev.
552 (1935)5 Medina, "Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction," 31 Col. L. Rev. 238
(1931)i Gavit, "Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata," So U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 386 (1932)i and anonymous note in 46 Yale L.J. 159 (1936).
In declining to express an opinion as to the application of the principles of res
judicata to disputes over the jurisdiction over subject matter, the American Law Institute
inserted the following caveat in their Restatement, Conflict of Laws at section 451: "A
sues B in Nevada for divorce. B enters an appearance and pleads that neither A nor B
is domiciled in Nevada. The court finds that A is domiciled in Nevada and renders a
decree of divorce against B. Subsequently B sues A in Illinois for divorce. A pleads the
Nevada decree. The caveat of the Restatement leaves open the effect of the Nevada
decree." (Note that the principal case decides the matter by giving effect to the Virginia
decree.)
It would appear that the United States Supreme Court had once previously committed
itself to this doctrine in the case of Chicago, R. 1. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S.
6ss, 46 S.Ct. 420, 70 L.Ed. 757, 53 A.L.R. 1265 (1926). In that case there had been
an action by the widow of a deceased employee of the railroad for damages under the
Iowa Workmen's Compensation Act, on the theory that the decedent had been killed while
employed in intrastate commerce, and a recovery was allowed on that theory. Subse-
quently the federal case was filed in the Minnesota District Court by the decedent's admin-
istrator, for the purpose of recovering a claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
on the theory that the deceased was engaged in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court
ruled that the finding of the Iowa State Court to the effect that the decedent was engaged
in intrastate commerce was res adjadicata in the federal action.
For state court decisions following the same trend, see: Chamblin v. Chamblits, 362
Ill. 588, s N.E. (2d) 73, 104 A.L.R. 1183 (1936); and Reid v. Independent Union of
All Workers, zoo Minn. 599, 275 N.W. 300 (1937).
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actions9" for here the court ruled that the decree of the Virginia court
was conclusive as to the residence requirement of the husband, thus giv-
ing it jurisdiction over the subject matter and the resultant power to
decree an absolute divorce.
It might be well to insert a caveat at this point inasmuch as the opin-
ion of the court is not definitely dear on this matter. In the latter part
of the opinion there are passages which indicate a feeling on the part of
the court that the participation of the non-resident wife in the proceed-
ings amounted to a general appearance on the merits. If this construc-
tion is to prevail, the court might well have made such statement at the
outset of the opinion and saved itself the troublesome duty of meeting
and avoiding the jurisdictional question. A full consideration of the case,
however, would seem, to indicate that the court did respect the special
appearance of such, but following the theory of the Baldwin case (and
specifically citing that case), held that the wife had had her day in court
on that issue and was now precluded from again raising the same.
In another decision, still more recent than the principal case,1" the
court has reiterated its stand. In that case there had been a proceeding
in the federal court for reorganization of a corporation under Section
7 7B of the Bankruptcy Act, releasing certain guarantors and declaring
all creditors to be bound thereby. Subsequently a creditor began an
action in a state court against the guarantor and after the instigation of
that proceeding, petitioned the federal court to modify its decree on the
ground that it lacked jurisdiction to render the same. The federal court
specifically ruled that it had such jurisdiction and thereafter the guaran-
tors were permitted to set up the federal decree for reorganization and
their release as res judicata in the state action, the Supreme Court of the
United States saying, "After a Federal court has decided the question
of the jurisdiction over the parties as a contested issue, the court in which
the plea of res judicata is made has not the power to inquire again into
that jurisdictional fact."1
II
That phase of the principal case which treats of the validity of foreign
divorce decrees is the one most apt to become the subject of comment
"' It is questionable whether this doctrine will be extended to other types of cases as
well. The case of Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 61l, 46 S.Ct. 420,
7o L.Ed. 757, 53 A.L.R. 1265 (x9z6), would seem to be in accord with respect to the
matter of interstate commerce, but see Baltimore Mail S.S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N.Y. 379,
199 N.E. 628, 104 A.L.R. Io68 (1936) which is contra as to the matter of determination
of what constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce." The court therein said:
"A court without jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action can acquire no jurisdiction
by erroneous decision that it has jurisdiction."
10Stoll v. Gottlieb, - U.S.--, 59 S.Ct. 534, 83 L.Ed. 116 (1938).
" Stoll v. Gottlieb, supra, note io.
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and discussion. To view the opinion on this point in its proper setting it
is necessary to make a brief survey of the status of the foreign divorce
decree and to bring the same down to date, considering the collateral
influences which may or may not have caused the court to reach its de-
cision. Any proper survey of this nature would go back at least as far as
the case of Atherton v. 4therton. In that case the husband and wife
had maintained their marital domicile in Kentucky and subsequently the
wife left the husband and returned to the home of her mother in the
state of New York. Later, the husband brought an action for divorce
in Kentucky on the ground of desertion, service upon the wife being
made by mail to her New York address, in accordance with the Ken-
tucky law. Upon her failure to appear in the cause, the Kentucky court
entered a decree for the husband. Later, the wife began a proceeding
in the state of New York to secure a divorce on the ground of cruelty,
alleging that to be her reason for having left the husband in Kentucky.
Personal service was secured on the husband, and in defense he set up
the Kentucky decree. The New York court, disregarding the Kentucky
proceedings, entered a decree in favor of the wife as prayed for. Upon
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the New York decree was
reversed with instructions to give full faith and credit to the Kentucky
judgment.
This decision met with the approval of most writers and was in ac-
cord with the weight of judicial authority as understood at that time, 3
namely, that the action for a divorce could be instituted in the state of
the plaintiff's residence, and so long as the laws of that state as to resi-
dence, notice to the non-resident defendant, etc., 4 were observed, the
decree of the court dissolving the marriage was everywhere valid and
entitled to recognition. This right of a state to decree divorces for its
own citizens was recognized in the case of Pennoyer v. Neff" and was
expressly distinguished from the issue therein decided'" where the court
said, "The jurisdiction which every state possesses to determine the civil
status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe
the cohditions on which the proceedings affecting them may be com-
menced and carried on within its territory. The State, for example, has
absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage rela-
15 1i1 U.S. 355, 21 S.Ct. 544, 45 L.Ed. 794 (1901).
3 BisHop, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. To entitle the court to take jurisdiction, however,
it is sufficient that one of the parties be domiciled in the country; it is not necessary that
both should be.
"
4 See Cheeley v. Clayton, 110 U.S. 701, 4 S.Ct. 328, z8 L.Ed. z98 (1884).
15 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (878).
"i.e., That in an action for a personal judgment against a non-resident, service of
process cannot be made across state lines so as to bind the non-resident's property located
within the state.
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tion between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which
it may be dissolved. One of the parties, guilty of acts for which, by the
law of the state, a dissolution may be granted, may have removed to a
state where no dissolution is permitted. The complaining party would
therefore fail if a divorce were sought in the state of the defendant; and
if application could not be made to the tribunals of the complainant's
domicile in such case, and the proceedings be there instituted without
personal service of process or personal notice to the offending party, the
injured citizen would be without redress."'"
Notwithstanding this general rule which was followed by a majority
of the states, a definite minority, including some of the more important
states, 8 came to adopt a different rule, prompted to a great extent by
public policy as dictated by their own strict laws concerning divorce. In
these states, a great reluctance was indicated on the part of their courts
to give effect to foreign divorce decrees which involved a disturbance of
the marital status of their own citizens.
With the state of the law on this point in such a condition came the
next, and probably most important, decision of the United States Su-
preme Court on the matter of validity of foreign divorce decrees.19 In
the Haddock case a husband and wife had been married in New York
and the husband immediately left that state, subsequently establishing a
residence in Connecticut where he secured a divorce on the ground of
desertion, service on the wife being had by publication through mail to
her last known New York address. Some years later the wife sued for
separation and alimony in New York in which action the husband was
personally served in that state, and as a defense to which he set up the
Connecticut decree. Again as in the Atherton case,2" the New York
court denied validity of the foreign decree and entered a decree for the
wife. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the judg-
ment of the New York court was affirmed by a five to four decision.
The court accepted as conclusive the finding of the New York court
that the husband had been guilty of desertion, and held that the Con-
necticut decree, although valid in the state where rendered, need not
be given effect elsewhere except by comity.
This ruling of the court at once aroused a flood of protest through-
out the country and was made the subject of widespread editorial criti-
"? For other authority aszerting the right of a state through its courts to determine
the marital status of its own citizens, see: Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856) and Hard-
ing v .Allcn, 9 Greenl. 140 (Me. I83z).
I' New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina.
'. Haddock v. Haddock, zo U.S. 56z, z6 S.Ct. 5Z5, 5o L.Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. x
(19o6).
o Supra, note zz.
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cism,2' particularly at the hands of Professor Beale.2" Perhaps the most
serious ground for criticism of the Haddock case is that it resulted in the
"dual-status" theory of matrimony. Under this theory, a person secur-
ing a divorce under any circumstance not recognized by the decision, 3
would be held to be a single person in the state which had granted the
decree, free to remarry and bear legitimate children who would be en-
titled to inherit his property upon his death, while in other states, the
decree being recognized through comity only, he might still retain his
marital status and consequently be guilty of bigamy under their laws
upon a second marriage, and the children of such marriage, being illegit-
imate, would be deprived of the right to inhert the guilty parent's prop-
erty.
2 3A
In making its decision in the Haddock case, however, the court did
not dose all the doors to extraterritorial validity of divorce decrees.
There still remained the situation presented in the Atherton case,
24
namely, a decree secured by one of the parties at their last marital
domicile. Such a decree continued to command full faith and credit, as
the .Atherton case was affirmed on that specific ground.
Notwithstanding the prediction on the part of one writer2" that the
court would soon have another opportunity to reconsider this subject,
over 3o years elapsed between the decision in the Haddock case and
that of the principal case.
The only case decided by the court during that interval which in-
21 See: Sale, "The Haddock Case-Decrees for Divorce on Substituted Service Not
Protected by Full Faith and Credit Clause of Constitution," 6z Cent. L. Journ. 333
(29o6); Anonymous notes, zz Law Quart. Rev. 237 i 4o Am. L. Rev. 58o; and 4 Mich.
L. Rev. 534 (19o6). For an article in support of the decision in the Haddock case, see:
Schofield, "The Doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock," a Ill. L. Rev. zag (19o6).
22 Beale, "Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce," i9 Harv. L. Rev. 586
(x9o6). However, Professor Beale has substantially modified his views with respect to
Haddock v. Haddock as therein set forth in a later article, "Haddock Revisited," 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 417 (igz6) see infra, note 31.
"' The Haddock case recognized three general situations in which a divorce, secured
in a state other than that of the residence of the defendant spouse would be valid and
entitled to full faith and credit:
(a) Where the defendant appeared voluntarily in the suit,
(b) Where the defendant was personally served with process in the granting
state,
(c) Where the granting state was the last matrimonial domicile of the parties.
And in addition to these, all foreign divorces could be given extraterritorial effect through
comity.2sm The last mentioned evil has been nullified in many states through the enactment
of remedial legislation similar to that contained in Ohio G. C. sec. 0503-15 which pro-
vides: " . . . The issue of parents whose marriage is null in law, shall nevertheless be
legitimate."
"' Supra, note 12.
25 Sale, supra, note za: "It is safe to predict that not many years vill elapse before
the same question will again be argued before the Supreme Court of the United States in
an effort to convince the court of its error."
2o8
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volved the question of validity of foreign divorce decrees was that of
Thompson v. Thompson.26 That case involved a suit by the wife in the
District of Columbia to secure a decree of separation and alimony. Dur-
ing the pendency of the action, the husband secured a divorce a mensa
et thoro on the ground of desertion in the state of Virginia where the
parties had been married, and had continued to reside after marriage,
and in which state the husband had continued to reside until the time of
the proceedings. Service on the non-resident wife was had by publica-
non. The Supreme Court held that the District of Columbia court was
bound to give full faith and credit to the Virginia court's decree, relying
on the A4therton case, and accepting, or seeming to accept, as conclusive,
the findings of the Virginia court as to the wife's desertion. "
During the 30 year period between the Haddock case and the DazAs
case, still more articles appeared on the subject, most of which were
directed toward a reconciliation of the doctrine set forth in the former
case in an effort to devise possible extensions thereto, or to evolve a
plausible explanation of that case to serve as a basis for the disposition of
future cases."7
One of the first of such articles was written by Professor Beale,2"
in which he compromised his position first taken with respect to this
case,2 9 making certain modifications in his earlier views. In that article
he saw some benefit to be achieved from the Haddock case, in that it
imposed certain limitations upon the minority doctrine which had there-
tofore refused to give any effect to foreign decrees. Under the principle
thus established they were compelled to give such decrees full faith and
credit when rendered at the marital domicile. The author also saw an
additional benefit in the rule so established wherein the court was be-
ginning to limit the emphasis of the interest of the state in the marital
:: 226 U.S. S51, 33 S.Ct. 129, 57 L.Ed. 347 (1913).
'" The ruling of the court in that respect seems to contravene the usually accepted
doctrine that a divorce a mena et thoro, like judicial separation, is a proceeding in per-
sonam. That doctrine is based on the theory that since such a divorce does not dissolve
the marriage ties, but justifies the parties' living apart, there is no action upon status or
res and consequently jurisdiction must be in personam. For criticism of the Thompson case
on this ground, see 13 Col. L. Rev. 241 (913) and 23 Yale L.J. 88 (1913). See also
Restatement, Conflict of Lawsj sec. 114, which provides that both parties must be subject
to the court which renders a decree of judicial separation. In Pettis v. Pettis, 9z Conn.
6o8, ioz Atl. 13, 4 A.L.R. 85z (917), the Connecticut court refused to give full faith
and credit to a New York decree of judicial separation, where the New York court did
not have jurisdiction over both of the parties. The latter case is noted in 17 Col. L. Rev.
639 (1917) and 27 Yale L.J. 117 (1917).
27See: Beale, "Haddock Revisited," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (gz6)i Strahorn, "A
Rationale of the Haddock Case," 32 Ill. L. Rev. 796 (1938)i McClintock, "Fault as an
Element of Divorce Jurisdiction," 37 Yale L. J. S 64 (z928); Anonymous note in 44 Yale
L. J. 488 (1935).
2" Beale, supra, note 27.
29 Beale, sapra, note 22.
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status and domestic relations of its citizens, and was beginning to give
effect to the personal interest of the parties concerned therein. Under
the rule as set forth, a certain amount of "fair play" or, as stated by
another writer" "feasibility of defending," was accorded the non-resi-
a proceeding. But in making these observations, Professor Beale adds
a qualification, namely, that the absent spouse may, in some manner,
waive this right to have his interests protected by a foreign court, either
by his own misconduct which has justified the other spouse in seeking a
foreign domicile, or by consenting to the establishment of such separate
domicile." These qualifications set forth by Professor Beale have found
their way into the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,2 and have been
referred to8 as the "Beale-Restatement addenda."
The principal case indicates a favorable attitude toward this "ad-
denda" wherein it distinguishes the facts from those of the Haddock
case by saying of the latter case, "There was no suggestion that she was
at fault or did anything to disrupt the marital relation." And again in
the opinion, speaking of the wife's conduct in the .principal case as justify-
ing the husband's acquisition of a separate domicile in Virginia, "In view
of these facts and of her conduct adjudged repugnant to the marital
relation, it would be unreasonable to hold that his domicile in Virginia
was not sufficient to entitle him to obtain a divorce having the same
force in the District as in that state." Thus, it would appear that the
o Strahorn, "The Supreme Court Revisits Haddock," 33 Il1. L. Rev. 4zz (1938).
dent defendant, who, it must be conceded, has a definite interest in such
s
1 Beale, supra, note 27, at page 426. At this point Professor Beale sets forth what
the writer chooses to term the "shifting matrimonial domicile theory," and which is a
separate branch of the subject, in no way related to the problems of the principal case.
While matrimonial domicile is a term receiving constant use in the decisions, it is not
one to be found often defined. For the purpose of this note it may be said to be that place
at which the husband and wife last lived, or are living together as such. A question then
arises where there is a separation and subsequently both parties leave that domicile, taking
up new domiciles in separate and different states: Where is the "matrimonial domicile"
in such a case? According to Professor Beale, it must be at the domicile of the innocent
party. This doctrine was invoked in the case of Montmorency v. Montmorency, 139 S.W.
i68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), wherein it was held that the innocent spouse carried the
matrimonial domicile with her. That case has been approved in a dictum in Parker v.
Parker, 222 Fed. 186 at x9o (igis).
" Sec. 113 provides: "A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve
the marriage of spouses of whom one is domiciled within the state and the other is dom-
iciled outside the state, if
(a) the spouse who is not domiciled within the state
i) has consented that.the other spouse acquire a separate home; or
(ii) by his or her misconduct has ceased to have the right to object to the
acquisition of such separate home; or
(iii) is personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state which grants the
divorce;
or
(b) the state is the last state in which the spouses were domiciled together as
man and wife."
33 Strahorn, supra, note 30 at page 406.
2.io
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court has added a new ground to the recognition of foreign divorce de-
crees in addition to those set forth in the Haddock case, by the adoption
of the Beale-Restatement addenda." Consequently, a foreign divorce
decree, acquired in a state other than that of the last marital domicile
must be accorded full faith and credit if the element of fault is found to
have justified the establishment of a separate domicile. 33" .
Still another article, 3 appearing during the 30 year interval between
the Haddock and the Davis cases, has considered the factor of fault as
an element of jurisdiction and has subjected that test to criticism.3" The
basis for such criticism lies in the fact that no final adjudication of fault
can be made except by the Supreme Court of the United States, since
fault would become a jurisdictional fact to be determined by each court
on its own initiative, independent of the findings of the court rendering
a previous decision, and only by appeal to that court could the matter be
finally resolved.
This criticism has been made the subject of further comment"
wherein it is indicated that the court has never made an independent
finding of fact as to the fault of the parties in such cases. In the Atherton
case, the court accepted the findings of the Kentucky court to the effect
that the wife was guilty of desertion, notwithstanding that the New York
court had found that she left the matrimonial domicile because of the
cruelty of the husband. In the Haddock case, the court accepted the
finding of the New York court to the effect that the husband had been
guilty of desertion, in spite of the fact that the Connecticut court, in
rendering the earlier decree, had found the wife to have been guilty
of such an act. So also in the Thompson case, the court accepted the
finding of the Virginia court as to the wife's fault in deserting the
husband. In none of these cases does it appear the the court conducted
an independent investigation of its own on the matter of fault, nor is
it plausible to see how such an investigation can be made with any
degree of reliability. As is stated by the writer in 37 Yale Law Jour-
nal,"' "As an issue of fact, the question of fault is one difficult to
determine. It is probable that the case does not often arise where the
3" In requiring full faith and credit to be accorded a decree of divorce granted at
the domicile of an innocent spouse, which is not the matrimonial domicile, the court
appears to have gone beyond the point intended by the American Law Institute in their
drafting of sec. 113 of the Restatement, Conflict of Laws. Goodrich, supra, note 9, at
sec. iz8 indicates that the purpose of sec. 113 was to set forth the situations for proper
venue, and did not bear on full faith and credit, but that writers have construed it as
covering the constitutional question as well. Se also in this connection, BEALE, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1935), sec. 113.11.
*' McClintoc, supra, note 27.
's McClintock, supra, note 27 at page 572.
, Anonymous note in Yale L.J., supra, note 27.
17 McClintock, supra, note 27 at page 572.
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fault is all on one side. In many cases it is almost impossible to say
who is most at fault even if all the acts of the parties are known. It
would not be surprising to find that the courts will differ as to this ques-
tion of fault. They did differ in Atherton v. Atherton, Haddock v.
Haddock, and Thompson v. Thompson."
Another explanation of the principal case is to be found in Professor
Strahorn's article,"8 under what he styles, "The 'individualized approach'
explanation." It is the opinion of that writer that due to the indiscrimi-
nate method in which the court discussed the various issues involved in
the case, the court is indicating a desire to refrain from committing itself
to definite rules concerning full faith and credit, and is adopting a policy
of granting or refusing certiorari in future cases not coming squarely
within the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock on an individualized ap-
proach theory considering the subjective factors involved. Professor
Strahorn also points out that it may be significant that actual notice was
given the non-resident spouse in the DavAs case, while in the Haddock
case, notice was attempted to be given by publication and mail only.
A case which appears to bear out Professor Strahorn's theory with
regard to the court's policy of granting and withholding certiorari in this
respect, is Hellmuth v. Hellmuth 9 wherein the parties had entered into
a formal separation agreement in the District of Columbia and thereafter
the husband moved to Maryland and subsequently secured a divorce
without giving notice to the wife, except by publication. Later the wife
sought a declaratory ruling contending that the Maryland decree was
not entitled to full faith and credit. The decree was upheld and the
Court of Appeals of the District affirmed the ruling, not only on the
point of full faith and credit, but as a matter of comity as permitted by
dictum in the Haddock case. In denying certiorari, the Supreme Court
evidenced a willingness to "go along" with the court in this respect.
Speaking also of this case, Professor Strahorn says,4" "On the point of
the present standing of the Haddock dictum for local validity and volun-
tary recognition by comity, we have the denial of certiorari in the Hell-
muth case as a mute tolerance of that situation and so we can say that
the court approves it by not disapproving it when opportunity afforded."
In terminating this discussion, the writer feels that two rather defi-
as Strahorn, supra, note 30 at page 417. Professor Strahorn has subdivided his article
into the following four divisions or explanations of the principal case:
(i) The "Joint Domicile" explanation.
(z) The "General Appearance" explanation. (Treated in Part I supra.)
(3) The "Beale-Restatement addenda" explanation.
(4) The "individualized approach" explanation.
a:98 Fed. (zd) 431, cerf. denied, 59 s.ct- 97 (938).
0 Strahorn, supral note 3o at page 4zz.
nite conclusions may be drawn as a result of the decision in the principal
case. The first is that, where matters are contested in a special appear-
ance relating to jurisdiction, both of the person and of the subject mat-
ter,4 and the court makes a specific ruling on these matters, they become
res judicata for the purpose of future litigation in foreign courts. If this
first conclusion be sound, and the decision in the principal case is not
construed as having been founded on a general appearance of the de-
fendant spouse, then there has been a definite extension of the doctrine of
Haddock v. Haddock. That extension consists of permitting one spouse
to obtain a divorce in a state wherein the other is neither domiciled, resi-
denced, nor personally served, even though that state is not the matri-
monial domicile,4" if it be found that the plaintiff in such an action
established such a separate domicile as a result of the fault of the other;
and such a decree, when rendered, will be entitled to full faith and
credit. How this matter of fault will be determined seems to be an open
question. It is submitted that the only method by which it may be
finally adjudicated is by an appeal to the United States Supreme Court
in those instances in which a divorce is subsequently sought by the other
spouse at his or her domicile and in which the decree of the first court
i denied full faith and credit. Since such an appeal is not a question of
right,43 it may well be that the extension of the Haddock case will not
have great practical significance. The result may be, as indicated by
Professor Strahorn,44 that in the future the court will pick and choose
the cases by granting or denying certiorari.
CHARLES A. REYNARD.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FINALITY OF LEGISLATIVE RECORDS
On July 22, 1936, the General Assembly of the State of Ohio
voted to take a five minute recess and thereupon disbanded to their
respective homes. On December 8, 1936, the General Assembly con-
vened and adopted a motion that entries be made in the respective
journals of the House and the Senate to show the convening in session of
" In stating that the extension covers both jurisdiction of the person and subject
matter, it must be remembered that the court has only committed itself to this doctrine with
respect to actions for divorce, and may not hold to the same views in other types of actions.
See notes 9 and ga, supra.
"o The term "matrimonial domicile" is here used in the same sense as defined in
note 31, supra.
4 zS U.S.C.A. (Judicial Code) sec. 344; FOSTER, "FEDERAL PRACTICE," 6th ed., sec.
692c.
" Strahorn, supra, note 40.
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